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 1 
Narrative, Postmodernity and the Problem of 
‘Religious Illiteracy’ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is popular nowadays to claim not only that narrative is the most effective way to 
communicate religious knowledge but also that narrative provides the framework within 
which religious lifestyles and practices are meaningful. However, many today lack familiarity 
with the narratives of traditional religions. In other words, they suffer from ‘religious 
illiteracy’. This article considers the problem of how religion can become meaningful to such 
people. The view that religion can be divested of its outdated cultural accoutrements and 
presented in a form that resonates with postmodern secular culture is considered and found 
to be problematic. If acquiring a religion is like acquiring a culture, or a language, it seems 
unlikely that a deeper appreciation of a religious tradition will be facilitated by divesting it of 
its traditional cultural expressions. Moreover, the view that religious lifestyles should be 
emphasised rather than religious belief seems to be more a symptom of the problem of 
‘religious  illiteracy’ than a solution to it. The article concludes that both of these responses 
fail to provide a solution to the problem and that an alternative strategy  is urgently required. 
 
 
It is popular today to hold that reducing every important religious claim to a proposition that 
is either literally true or literally false often misses out something of vital significance to 
religious language. However, that the only meaningful sense in which a claim can be true or 
false is in its expressing a truth-evaluable proposition was a core assumption of much modern 
thought. Postmodern religious thinkers, in contrast to modern ones, are united in their 
antipathy towards this assumption.
1
 And this has led them to explore other ways in which 
                                                
1
Friedrich Nietzsche seems to have anticipated this feature of postmodernism when he 
declared: ‘The falseness of a judgement is not for us necessarily an objection to a judgement; 
in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-
promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating…’. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, translated by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), I.4. 
 2 
religious ideas might be expressed, communicated and understood. Many, such as John 
Milbank and John Thornhill, argue that narratives—or, in other words, stories—are the most 
appropriate medium through which to express religious understanding, with Milbank 
claiming that ‘narrating’ is 
 
a more basic category than either explanation or understanding: unlike either of these it does not 
assume punctiliar facts or discrete meanings. Neither is it concerned with universal laws, nor 
universal truths of the spirit. Yet it is not arbitrary in the sense that one can repeat a text in just 
any fashion, although one can indeed do so in any number of fashions.
2  
 
Indeed, narratives form a large part of the Judeo-Christian scriptures. And it has been 
suggested that the stories contained in these sacred texts possess universal appeal because 
they resonate with our common human experience.
3
 It could be argued, moreover, that the 
preponderance of narratives within these texts was overlooked by those moderns who read 
them while searching exclusively for information expressible in the form of statements 
corresponding to mooted facts. Reading the sacred texts with the expectation of finding such 
information may have contributed to the loss of confidence in them that many experienced 
during the last century. For example, when the Bible was taken to claim, literally, that God 
created the world in seven days, then modern readers tended to assume that they had found a 
straightforwardly false claim in the sacred text rather than a true one. And the quite different 
sort of understanding that the narrative form might convey was regarded by many modern 
thinkers as of little value in contrast to the true statements and, supposedly, objective 
knowledge available by means of the methods of the natural sciences. 
The re-evaluation of religious texts in terms of narratives only progressed when the view 
                                                
2
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), p. 267. 
3
With respect to the narratives contained in the Christian Scriptures, John Thornhill claims 
that ‘the biblical story which reaches its climax in the life, death, and exaltation of Jesus of 
Nazareth discloses a truth about human existence which is universal. In the light of the 
biblical story, we can find the ultimate significance of our own stories. And conversely, the 
story of each of us can shed light on the ongoing story of the Christian people as a whole, the 
church’. John Thornhill, Modernity: Christianity’s Estranged Child Reconstructed (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), p. 193. And one easily can regard the central narratives 
of the other Abrahamic faiths as functioning in exactly the same way. 
 3 
that scientific knowledge was fundamentally different in kind from knowledge obtained in 
the humanities was challenged. For example, Jean-François Lyotard, while holding that 
knowledge within the humanities is not fundamentally different in kind from knowledge 
within the natural sciences, proceeds to argue that a comparison of scientific knowledge with 
the kind of knowledge that is expressed in narratives, or stories, reveals that both 
 
are composed of sets of statements; the statements are ‘moves’ made by the players within the 
framework of generally applicable rules; these rules are specific to each particular kind of 
knowledge, and the ‘moves’ judged to be ‘good’ in one cannot be of the same type as those 
judged ‘good’ in another, unless it happens that way by chance.
4
 
 
So, although scientific claims and narrative are on a par insofar as they are both species of 
discourse, nevertheless, according to Lyotard, the criteria appropriate for judging a ‘move’ 
within science differ substantially from those relevant to evaluating a ‘move’ within a 
narrative. Moreover, he claims that 
 
 narrative knowledge does not give priority to the question of its own legitimation and…it certifies 
itself in the pragmatics of its own transmission without having recourse to argumentation and 
proof. This is why its incomprehension of the problems of scientific discourse is accompanied by 
a certain tolerance: it approaches such discourse primarily as a variant in the family of narrative 
cultures. The opposite is not true. The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and 
concludes that they are never subject to argumentation or proof. He classifies them as belonging 
to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of 
opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, 
legends, fit only for women and children. At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light 
into this obscurantism, to civilize, educate, develop.
5
 
  
In other words, if our aim is to seek logical arguments or demonstrative proofs within 
narratives, we are approaching them in the wrong way. Hence, we should not be evaluating 
narratives either as forms of logical argument or in terms of their status as demonstrative 
proofs. Rather, their worth lies in the specific way in which they are employed.  
                                                
4
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
p. 26. 
5
Ibid., p. 27 
 4 
 How, then, are narratives employed in a manner that reveals their particular worth? 
According to Milbank: 
 
In a rhetorical perspective, narrative really does cease to be a mere appendage, because here the 
story of the development of a tradition—for example, in the case of Christianity, a story of 
preachings, journeyings, miracles, martyrdoms, vocations, marriages, icons painted and liturgies 
sung, as well as of intrigues, sins and warfare—really is the argument for the tradition (a perilous 
argument indeed, which may not prove persuasive at all), and not just the story of arguments 
concerning a certain X (for example the nature of human virtue) lying outside the story.
6
 
 
But if there are no extrinsic arguments supporting such narratives, one might wonder why 
they should be taken seriously. And moreover, what might compel us to favour the narratives 
within one religion over that of another? In response to this question, some, such as Milbank, 
cite the attractiveness of the religious lifestyles of those who are inspired by the religious 
narrative in question.
7
 Ultimately, Milbank claims, it is the appeal of a particular lifestyle that 
compels a person to prefer the narratives of that religious tradition to those of any other.
8
 
The prioritising of religious lifestyles over religious truth-claims was a common thread 
uniting several late-twentieth century religious thinkers. Some argued, in addition, that 
narratives are essential for a religious lifestyle. Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim that narrative is 
the condition of possibility for any meaningful action can be deployed in support of this 
conclusion. In a characteristic passage, MacIntyre asserts that 
 
man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He 
is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth…. I can 
only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or 
                                                
6
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, op. cit., p. 347. 
7
Cf. George Lindbeck: ‘Pagan converts to the catholic mainstream did not, for the most part, 
first understand the faith and then decide to become Christians; rather, the process was 
reversed: they first decided and then they understood. More precisely, they were first 
attracted by the Christian community and form of life’. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of 
Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1984), p. 132. 
8
On how the appeal of a particular lifestyle might compel a person to adopt a particular 
religious tradition, see V. S. Harrison, ‘Human Holiness as Religious Apologia’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 46 (1999): 63–82. 
 5 
stories do I find myself a part?’… Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, 
anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words.
9
 
 
Not only is the narrative approach consistent with the view that religious knowledge is 
intrinsically related to meaningful forms of life, but it is also, clearly, at one with the anti-
foundationalism that characterises much postmodern religious thought. Anti-foundationalism 
holds that there is no ultimate, ‘Archimedean point’ upon which our knowledge may be 
grounded. Every premise supporting a conclusion is, ultimately, open to doubt, and hence 
none stands as an indubitable foundation upon which a belief system can be reliably 
constructed. In the specific context of religious thought, anti-foundationalism feeds the denial 
that a person’s most basic religious beliefs and commitments are ultimately premised upon 
logical argumentation or demonstrative proofs, which coheres with Lyotard’s view that 
narrative should not be assessed in such terms. 
However, such anti-foundationalism is not taken by postmodernists to imply that religious 
beliefs and commitments are unreasonable, but rather that the reasonableness of subscribing 
to them can only be appraised from inside the form of life within which they are embedded. 
From this, it might be thought to follow, as George Lindbeck claims it does indeed follow, 
that 
 
basic religious and theological positions, like Kuhn’s scientific paradigms, are invulnerable to 
definitive refutation (as well as confirmation) but can nevertheless be tested and argued about in 
various ways, and these tests and arguments in the long run make a difference. Reason places 
constraints on religious as well as on scientific options even though these constraints are too 
flexible and informal to be spelled out in either foundational theology or a general theory of 
science. In short, intelligibility comes from skill, not theory, and credibility comes from good 
                                                
9
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1982), p. 
216. Anthony Giddens seems to offer a parallel analysis when he claims that ‘[p]ersonal 
meaninglessness—the feeling that life has nothing worthwhile to offer—becomes a 
fundamental psychic problem in late modernity. We should understand this phenomenon in 
terms of a repression of moral questions which day-to-day life poses, but which are denied 
answers. “Existential isolation” is not so much a separation of individuals from others as a 
separation from the moral resources necessary to live a full and satisfying existence….’. 
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Era 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 9. Although Giddens is concerned 
with moral knowledge, his remarks would also seem applicable to religious knowledge. 
 6 
performance, not adherence to independently formulated criteria.10 
 
If a religious worldview is to acquire its credibility from exemplary instances of living the 
form of life within which that worldview is embedded, and if a full understanding of that 
worldview requires skill in living the form of life in question, and, further, if that form of life 
is transmitted through a deep acquaintance with the stories that shape its worldview, then 
narrative becomes key. 
As we shall now see, however, any such account of the importance of narrative as a way 
of acquiring religious knowledge, and as underwriting religious lifestyles and practices, 
would appear to lead to a rather gloomy assessment of the situation in which traditional forms 
of faith are placed today. 
 
The Problem of ‘Religious Illiteracy’ 
 
Religious people can no longer simply assume, as their ancestors may have done, that the 
narratives of their particular faith-tradition inform the wider cultural and social practices, 
never mind the core values, of the society within which they live. Moreover, for those 
growing up within western culture today, socialization into a religious tradition, through 
familiarity with the narratives of that tradition, has ceased to be a matter of course, as it had 
been for many in the past. Thus, traditional religions have come to lack obvious points of 
contact with the dominant secular culture. One consequence of this is that a large fraction of 
the western population now find traditional faiths quite alien. Like the character in Philip 
Larkin’s well-known poem, ‘Church Going’, many people, although perhaps interested to 
some extent in religion, have come to lack the culturally-imbued skills necessary for a 
meaningful engagement with any of the faiths.
11
 There is much evidence in popular culture to 
suggest that many today do indeed experience traditional religion to be nothing short of 
incomprehensible, and that those who do, nevertheless, enquire into it further are rewarded 
only with extreme cultural dissonance.  
 In the not-too-distant-past, on the other hand, virtually everyone who had been brought 
up within western culture became familiar with the narratives of at least one religious 
tradition—which, far more often than not, was, of course, Christianity. Although many, 
                                                
10
Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, op. cit., pp. 130f. 
11
See Philip Larkin, ‘Church Going’, in Philip Larkin, Collected Poems (London: Marvell 
Press, 1988), pp. 97f. 
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clearly, did not subscribe to the beliefs of the religious tradition that was dominant within 
their culture, in many cases it nevertheless continued to inform their cultural understanding 
and values. In short, people by and large shared a set of religious symbols, images and values, 
which occupied a core role within the general culture, even if many chose not to belong to 
any faith-community. It would seem that this situation has now changed to such an extent that 
many people today seem incapable of understanding the languages, symbols and imagery of 
religion, are unfamiliar with sacred literature, and do not share the values endorsed by any of 
the Abrahamic faiths. 
 In Christian terms, an increasing number of people are thus ‘unchurched’. Among other 
things, they are ignorant of the differences between the various Christian denominations; a 
consideration that has, in many parts of the West, given rise to the need for a new approach to 
attracting new members on the part of institutionalised religions. Consider, for example, 
Alister McGrath’s depiction of one of the new style of non-denominational churches 
currently flourishing in the United States. McGrath provides a detailed description of the 
Willow Creek Community Church—a massive ecclesial complex in Illinois, whose average 
Sunday attendance is 20,000. McGrath opines that the appeal of this church would seem to 
be, in large part, due to its founders’ recognition that, because many North Americans were 
unchurched, a new approach was now required if the Christian ministry were to deliver their 
message effectively. For many people simply 
 
had no experience of clerical robes, hard pews, collection plates and the old-fashioned hymns. 
They did not know the language of the Christian tradition, and the Bible was a closed book to 
them. Why, its leaders wondered, did newcomers to the faith have to fight their way through a 
jungle of obsolete Christian cultural trappings to find out about Jesus? For an unchurched person 
the first experience of a traditional church worship service was likely to be the last. Old-fashioned 
music, dusty old hymnals, uncomfortable pews and a pompous liturgy were in stark contrast to 
the everyday life experienced by modern Americans.12 
 
In short, the founders of Willow Creek had begun to worry that many found traditional 
Christianity unappealing primarily because of, what they regarded as, its unessential and 
antiquated cultural accoutrements. Moreover, these accoutrements were totally alien to the 
target audience. So, in an effort to make their church ‘seeker sensitive’, they chose to 
abandon all such features. Clearly, this constitutes one way of responding to, what many 
regard as, a growing ‘religious illiteracy’ on the part of the general public. And it is a 
                                                
12
Alister E. McGrath, The Future of Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 61f. 
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response that seems to be in continuity with some of the modern forms of religion that had 
been promoted earlier in the twentieth century.
13
 However, it remains a highly contested 
‘solution’ to the problem of how to make religion accessible to those who lack inculturation, 
or socialization, into a religious tradition. 
 Indeed, many deny that accommodating a religious tradition to the cultural expectations 
of people today offers a genuine solution to this problem. This is because the claim that a 
religion, such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam, has an essential form that can be clearly 
demarcated from its cultural expression in any particular era is one that came under 
increasing attack during the twentieth century.
14
 It is now commonly argued that these 
religions have no essence, and that, at the deepest level, they are constituted solely by their 
varied cultural expressions. It follows that in order to be religious, one must be inculturated 
into a particular faith-community’s worldview and associated lifestyle, which will, of course, 
involve acquiring familiarity with the narratives expressing that tradition. However, as 
George Lindbeck has noted, it is precisely the difficulties facing those lacking such 
inculturation that can make the strategy of accommodation seem unavoidable because 
religions ‘have become foreign texts that are much easier to translate into currently popular 
categories than to read in terms of their intrinsic sense’.
15
 However, as Lindbeck proceeds to 
argue, the ease of translation into current cultural idioms is more apparent than real, and can 
disguise the fact that ‘religions, like languages, can be understood only in their own terms, 
not by transposing them into an alien speech’.
16
 
 On Lindbeck’s view, then, acquiring a religion is analogous to acquiring a culture or 
learning a language. It is a matter of ‘interiorizing outlooks that others have created, and 
mastering skills that others have honed’.
17
 However, as Lindbeck also notes, many today 
baulk at this process, because it would seem to be an affront to an individual’s freedom of 
choice and self-expression. Indeed, many, such as Don Cupitt, promote a view of religion as 
a deeply individual affair. It is a personal quest in which people are encouraged ‘to meet God 
first in the depths of their souls and then, perhaps, if they find something personally 
                                                
13
For example, liberal forms of Protestant Christianity, Reform Judaism and Modernist Islam. 
14
See V. S. Harrison, ‘The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006): 133–152. 
15
Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, op. cit., p. 124. 
16
Ibid., p. 129.  
17
Ibid., p. 22. 
 9 
congenial, to become part of a tradition or join a church’.
18
 If Lindbeck’s account of religion 
is correct, however, acquiring a religion without the help of a religious tradition is, if not 
impossible, extremely difficult; just as mastering a language without participating in a 
community that speaks that language is an onerous task—and one at which many fail.
19
 
 Furthermore, in Lindbeck’s view, ‘it is necessary to have the means for expressing an 
experience in order to have it, and the richer our expressive or linguistic system, the more 
subtle, varied, and differentiated can be our experience’.
20
 Analogously, he holds that the 
deeper one’s interiorization of a religious tradition, the more ‘subtle, varied, and 
differentiated’ will be the range of religious experiences accessible to one. The real problem 
of ‘religious illiteracy’, then, according to this view, is that without a certain degree of 
religious inculturation, a person will be unable to express, and, hence will be incapable of 
having, certain kinds of religious experience. And as beliefs and experiences are mutually 
reinforcing within any healthy worldview, it should be no surprise if religious beliefs that 
were not supported by appropriate religious experiences were found to be uncompelling. If 
this is an accurate account of the problem, then it would seem to follow that the strategy of 
accommodating religious beliefs and practices in order to meet current cultural expectations 
will fail to provide a long-term solution. Indeed, the only way to ameliorate the problem 
would be to provide people with the cultural skills necessary for a deep understanding of 
religion. However, as many have remarked, the transmission of these skills has, by the 
beginning of the third millennium, become progressively more attenuated. And this has, 
perhaps, been exacerbated by the steadily decreasing influence of religious thought upon 
western culture as a whole.
21
  
 This is a trend, moreover, that shows no signs of reversal. Indeed, Lindbeck, himself, is 
far from sanguine about the future prospects of traditional religion within western culture. For 
he regards this culture as having reached a stage in which ‘socialization is ineffective, 
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Ibid. 
19
As Lindbeck notes: ‘[T]o become religious—no less than to become culturally or 
linguistically competent—is to interiorise a set of skills by practice and training. One learns 
how to feel, act, and think in conformity with a religious tradition that is, in its inner 
structure, far richer and more subtle than can be explicitly articulated. The primary 
knowledge is not about the religion, not that the religion teaches such and such, but rather 
how to be religious in such and such ways.’ Ibid., p. 35. 
20
Ibid., p. 37. 
21
See, for example, ibid., p. 124. 
 10 
catechesis is impossible, and translation a tempting alternative…’,
22
 adding that the 
‘impossibility of effective catechesis in the present situation is partly the result of the implicit 
assumption that knowledge of a few tag ends of religious language is knowledge of the 
religion…’.
23
 
 While Lindbeck’s focus is upon Christianity, it would seem that his analysis describes 
the situation of each of the Abrahamic monotheisms in the modern West. Amongst many of 
those who adhere to one of these faiths, as well as amongst many who do not, there is 
evidence of a marked lack of religious education. It is plausible to regard this as symptomatic 
of the marginalization that the intellectual study of religion has suffered within modern 
western culture. Within academia, there would seem to be several reasons for this state of 
affairs. I shall mention two. First, the study of religion has become increasingly the preserve 
of those interested in cultural studies, specifically cultural anthropology. Many theology 
departments have turned into religious studies departments in a laudable effort to broaden the 
study of religion beyond Christianity. But many of these departments now focus upon ritual 
and other phenomenological expressions of religion, rather than upon religious ideas. Indeed, 
many are seemingly hostile to the study of ideas. Thus, the study of religions as intellectual 
systems has become increasingly less important within academia. Second, in the twentieth 
century, academia became increasingly driven by pragmatic interests. Funding was diverted 
from the human into the natural sciences and other disciplines that appeared to have 
immediate pragmatic value. Thus, the humanities became under-funded, and hence 
marginalized. The study of religious intellectual systems suffered enormously from this, as 
did generations of students who have become progressively deprived of any but the most 
superficial cultural education. 
 In the case of Christianity, however, the fault does not lie exclusively with the system of 
education favoured in the modern West. To a large extent, Christian theologians have been 
complicit in the process that has led to their marginalization within Western European and 
North American intellectual life. Throughout the twentieth century, many of them promoted a 
view of theology as a strictly academic discipline—one independent from the interests of 
Christian churches. Consequently, theology became increasingly irrelevant to Christians, who 
found it to have little, if anything, to contribute to their spiritual lives and hence to their 
religious inculturation.
24
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Ibid., p. 133. 
23
Ibid. 
24
Hans Urs von Balthasar was a lone voice in the mid-twentieth century warning theologians 
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 As noted above, the problem of growing ‘religious illiteracy’ in the West not only afflicts 
the Christian community, but would also seem to be a significant issue within Jewish and 
Muslim communities. The Muslim thinker, Sayyid Qutb, for example, claimed that the 
modern era constitutes a second jāhilīya (age of ignorance). In other words, he regarded the 
ignorance of many of his contemporaries as comparable to that of those living in the time 
prior to Muhammad: the first jāhilīya.
25
 If we turn to Judaism, we find that Jacob Neusner has 
drawn attention to, what he regards as, the intellectual decline of the Jewish community 
within the United States, noting 
 
the as yet unappreciated factor of sheer ignorance, the profound pathos of Jews’ illiteracy in all 
books but the books of the street and marketplaces of the day. The second generation beyond 
immigration to the USA received in the streets and the public press its education in Jewish 
existence. The third generation in a more benign age turned to the same sources and came away 
with nothing negative, but little positive. And by the fourth generation, the Jews in North America 
had attained complete illiteracy.
26
 
 
And in Neusner’s view, one immediate consequence of this situation is that most Jews have 
become incapable of valuing anything in the religious domain that does not lead to immediate 
enjoyment. Thus, they have been rendered incapable of valuing the depths and complexities 
of their religious tradition. Moreover, he argues that this has become equally the case 
regarding the adherents of other religious traditions in the West. Almost all, he avers, have 
been rendered virtually incapable of seeking, or understanding, anything beyond their 
immediate experience. The core of the problem in each case, or so he argues, is a profound 
illiteracy with regard to the history and literature of their respective traditions.
27
  
 We thus see that prominent scholars from each of the major monotheisms practised in the 
West have reached a remarkably similar conclusion about the main problem now facing their 
                                                                                                                                                  
of the consequences of the changed conception of theology. For a study of his analysis of the 
situation, see Victoria S. Harrison, The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2000).  
25
See Robert D. Lee, Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic 
Authenticity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 88. 
26
Jacob Neusner, Judaism in Modern Times: An Introduction and Reader (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 235f. 
27
See ibid, pp. 236ff. 
 12 
respective faiths: ‘religious illiteracy’. And in agreeing that the social changes and political 
upheavals that characterised the twentieth-century West have contributed to this ostensible 
defect, they are also united in identifying its main cause as the decline of an overtly religious 
culture in the West, hastened by the disappearance of any serious religious education. Given 
that western European secular culture is now ubiquitous to a degree unimaginable even at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and given that this culture is still in the ascendancy, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the problem that ‘religious illiteracy’ poses to the traditional 
faiths will become progressively more intractable as time proceeds. 
 Some would, no doubt, argue that the passing of religious culture and the demise of 
religious education constitutes a positive development, and, moreover, one to be encouraged. 
It is certainly undeniable that many today view religious education unfavourably. However, 
those who deem the decline of an overtly religious culture in the West to be progressive are 
likely to regard one possible result of this situation as extremely costly. For many who lack 
early familiarity with a religious tradition become religious later in life. And when they do, 
lacking any grounding in a tradition that manifests different intellectual expressions and that 
can facilitate a wide range of religious experiences, they are often attracted to religion in one 
of its fundamentalist, and sometimes one of its extremist, forms. Thus, a social policy that 
seeks to exclude religious education from the curriculum may, ironically, be contributing 
towards increased levels of religious fundamentalism.
28
 Perhaps, then, the kind of education 
most appropriate within a multicultural world is, rather than religious indoctrination, a form 
that fosters the comprehensive understanding of different traditions. 
 A further related consequence of the dominance of western European secular culture is 
that, as Sherwin Wine, the founder of Humanist Judaism,
29
 claims, religious identity is 
                                                
28
Indeed, such an outcome would seem to be predicted in Charles Liebman, ‘Extremism as a 
Religious Norm’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 22 (1983): 75–86. 
29
Rabbi Wine founded Humanist Judaism in the 1960s. The movement was motivated by, 
what he perceived as, the urgent need to revise Jewish practices and beliefs in accordance 
with quintessentially modern values, such as gender equality and human dignity. Members of 
this movement do not believe in a supernatural deity, and they reject the traditional dual-
Torah theory of revelation. Moreover, in contradistinction to the traditional view of Jewish 
identity, Wine argues that anyone who chooses to identify with the Jewish tradition can be a 
Jew, irrespective of that person’s birth. See, for example, Sherwin Wine, Judaism Beyond 
God (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1995). 
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experienced by most westerners today only with considerable effort.
30
 This brings to the fore 
another characteristic of current religiosity: namely, that assuming a religious identity—or 
being a religious person—has become a matter of choice, rather than hereditary. In a cultural 
shift that is surely not unconnected to the steadily increasing levels of ‘religious illiteracy’ in 
western society, religious communities have become communities of assent rather than 
descent. It would seem, moreover, that this change has been accompanied by similarly 
dramatic alterations within the belief systems of each religious tradition. This is because 
many people are now less inclined simply to accept all the beliefs that have, in the past, been 
part of, what is now, their tradition of choice, and are now more likely to evaluate critically 
each belief and to question the cogency of traditional religious concepts. 
 Given this new critical attitude to religious belief, and given the lack of religious 
inculturation experienced by many today, some have suggested that the only viable future for 
traditional religion lies in letting go of the modern fixation with the categories of belief and 
unbelief and emphasising instead religious lifestyles. 
 
Religion Beyond Belief and Unbelief 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that religion has become not so much a matter of belief but 
rather a way of being.
31
 Nietzsche would seem to have anticipated this development when he 
claimed that, in view of the bankruptcy of Christian theology, ‘only Christian practice, a life 
such as he lived who died on the cross, is Christian. Such a life is still possible today, for 
certain people even necessary: genuine, original Christianity will be possible at all times.’
32
 
 The mooted bankruptcy of the Abrahamic faiths as intellectual systems appears to have 
been conceded by influential thinkers within each tradition (some of whom having been 
recognised religious leaders within their communities). And many of these thinkers have, like 
Nietzsche, nevertheless asserted that religious lifestyles continue to be of value. Richard 
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Holloway, for example, argues that traditional Christianity as an intellectual system cannot 
survive into the future because, given the ideas and values that many now accept, traditional 
beliefs are no longer tenable. In the face of this situation, he proposes that we go beyond both 
belief and unbelief, and embrace, instead, a ‘way of action’. It is, he argues, ‘more important 
to follow the way of Jesus than to believe or disbelieve the traditional Christian claims about 
him. Above all…the task of Christianity today is the challenge, not to go on interpreting the 
world in the ancient way, but to start disturbing it in a new way’.
33
 Thus, the trend seems to 
favour orthopraxy—practice in accordance with faith—over orthodoxy. 
 Indeed, many religious thinkers would seem to be united in their emphasis of religious 
lifestyles and spirituality in preference to beliefs that are constituted by demonstrative 
propositions. Does this suggest that, as we enter the twenty-first century, religious belief has 
arrived at a dead-end? It is, surely, still open to religious thinkers today to seek more nuanced 
accounts of the relationship between religious beliefs, experience and truth. Thus, it may not 
necessarily be the case that the focus on experience and practice so prominent in religious 
self-understanding today is incompatible with commitment to religious beliefs. And 
consequently, there would seem to be a legitimate task ahead for philosophers of religion and 
theologians who seek to examine not only these beliefs but also their relation to the 
experience of religious believers.  
 Nevertheless, the trend in favour of orthopraxy resonates with the changing conception 
of religious thought and language that is evident within each of the monotheisms. The 
attention of many religious thinkers has clearly shifted away from the metaphysics of theism 
and towards the human dimensions of religious experience. This change of focus can be 
clearly seen in, for example, the work of Richard Rubenstein, who claims that 
 
[c]ontemporary theology reveals less about God than it does about the kind of men we are. It is 
largely an anthropological discipline. Today’s theologian, be he Jewish or Christian, has more in 
common with the poet and creative artist than with the metaphysician and physical scientist. He 
communicates a very private subjectivity. Its relevance lies in the possibility that he may enable 
other men to gain insight and clarify their religious lives in the face of common experience.
34
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 This new appreciation of the importance of religious lifestyles has paved the way for a 
deeper appreciation of the significance of the narratives that provide their framework of 
meaning and that shape the experiential context within which they are practised. Increasingly, 
religions have come to be seen as worldviews or systems of meaning, whose ‘truths’ are most 
aptly expressed through narrative and hence cannot be isolated from their context within 
extremely complex traditions, or from within the forms of life they inspire. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have considered two popular responses to the problem of how successfully to transmit a 
religious tradition to people who have grown up within postmodern secular culture. The first 
seeks to make religion accessible by divesting it of its traditional cultural expressions and 
presenting it in a way that is not culturally alienating to those at home in the secular culture 
ascendant in the West today. The second aims for the same goal by distinguishing between 
orthopraxy and orthodoxy and claiming that the former should be emphasised given that the 
categories of belief and unbelief have become culturally inappropriate. 
 However, despite the obvious appeal of both responses, the argument, considered above, 
that narrative provides the condition of possibility for meaningful participation in religious 
lifestyles, suggests that both solutions are inadequate to solve the problem posed by, what I 
have called, ‘religious illiteracy’. One problem with the first response is that the narratives 
which express religious ideas would seem to be, at least partly, constitutive of a religion’s 
cultural expression. According to this view, there is no such thing as religious truth that can 
be abstracted from its narrative expression and then deposited into another form deemed to be 
more culturally appropriate.  And, as we have seen, a problem with the second response is 
that religious lifestyles will appear incomprehensible to those lacking familiarity with the 
narratives that frame them. Attempting to adopt a religious lifestyle without adequate 
knowledge of the narratives that shape it could, perhaps, be compared to trying to learn a 
language which no longer has a community of competent speakers. The aspirants would 
surely be, to borrow from Alisdair MacIntyre, ‘unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions 
as in their words’.
35
 Thus, attempting to address the problem of ‘religious illiteracy’ by 
emphasising religious lifestyles rather than religious belief would seem to be a symptom of 
the problem rather than a solution to it.  
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 The seeming inadequacies of both the strategies considered might, however, explain the 
tendency exhibited by many today to convert from the more liberal religious groups into the, 
ostensibly, more robust varieties. It would seem that many prefer what appear to them to be 
more historically grounded and tradition-imbued forms of faith, and are thus more inclined to 
convert, for example, from Reform Judaism to Hasidism, or from evangelical Christianity to 
either Eastern Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism, or from cultural Islam to some form of 
revivialism. 
 Thus, despite the current trend towards orthopraxy combined with the popular belief that 
religious ideas are more aptly expressed through narrative than by propositional forms of 
language, and despite the emphasis upon religious anthropology that can be found in the 
work of many religious thinkers, forms of faith that can make a convincing appeal to 
‘orthodoxy’ would still seem to stand at an advantage over those that seemingly cannot. What 
seems clear is that the attempt to make a religion accessible to those lacking religious 
inculturation by divesting it either of its native cultural expressions or of its traditional beliefs 
does not seem to be a viable alternative to providing people with the culturally-imbued skills 
necessary for acquiring a deep understanding and appreciation of the religion. Finally, allow 
me to add that, in a multicultural world, it would surely seem desirable to encourage the 
development of the skills necessary to acquire an appreciation of a range of faith traditions, 
not just one. 
 
 
 
